國立政治大學歷史學系

彭真與劉少奇政治關係之研究(1928-1966)

The Political Relationship between Peng Zhen and Liu Shaoqi (1928-1966)

關於中共早期的重要領導人彭真和劉少奇之間的政治關係問 題，西方學界有一個相當普遍流行的觀點—劉少奇、彭真上下 之間長期保持庇護、扈從的派系關係，休戚與共、互為照應，並 且在政治上多與毛澤東對立和抗衡。本文經過細密的爬梳和分析 後，認為相關說法與歷史實際情況有嚴重的出入。彭真、劉少奇 結識早、也數次共事，但是他們對毛澤東的政治信從和效忠，隨 著後者最高領袖地位的確立而深植在心。經營與毛澤東的關係、 維持其對自身的信任和好感，也皆成為彭真、劉少奇各自的首要 之務。在此背景下，彭真、劉少奇之間如何看待和定位對方，雖 不無受到雙方直接互動經驗的影響，但最主要還是基於彼此與毛 澤東的關係親疏和變化。從1940年代中期到1960年代前半葉，彭 真視劉少奇為毛澤東的政治副手和繼承人而多予敬重和配合；劉 少奇見彭真屢受毛澤東器重，也對之加以信任和重視。在1962年 經濟調整問題和1964年社會主義教育運動上，劉少奇與毛澤東出關於中共早期的重要領導人彭真和劉少奇之間的政治關係問 題，西方學界有一個相當普遍流行的觀點—劉少奇、彭真上下 之間長期保持庇護、扈從的派系關係，休戚與共、互為照應，並 且在政治上多與毛澤東對立和抗衡。本文經過細密的爬梳和分析 後，認為相關說法與歷史實際情況有嚴重的出入。彭真、劉少奇 結識早、也數次共事，但是他們對毛澤東的政治信從和效忠，隨 著後者最高領袖地位的確立而深植在心。經營與毛澤東的關係、 維持其對自身的信任和好感，也皆成為彭真、劉少奇各自的首要 之務。在此背景下，彭真、劉少奇之間如何看待和定位對方，雖 不無受到雙方直接互動經驗的影響，但最主要還是基於彼此與毛 澤東的關係親疏和變化。從1940年代中期到1960年代前半葉，彭 真視劉少奇為毛澤東的政治副手和繼承人而多予敬重和配合；劉 少奇見彭真屢受毛澤東器重，也對之加以信任和重視。在1962年 經濟調整問題和1964年社會主義教育運動上，劉少奇與毛澤東出關於中共早期的重要領導人彭真和劉少奇之間的政治關係問 題，西方學界有一個相當普遍流行的觀點—劉少奇、彭真上下 之間長期保持庇護、扈從的派系關係，休戚與共、互為照應，並 且在政治上多與毛澤東對立和抗衡。本文經過細密的爬梳和分析 後，認為相關說法與歷史實際情況有嚴重的出入。彭真、劉少奇 結識早、也數次共事，但是他們對毛澤東的政治信從和效忠，隨 著後者最高領袖地位的確立而深植在心。經營與毛澤東的關係、 維持其對自身的信任和好感，也皆成為彭真、劉少奇各自的首要 之務。在此背景下，彭真、劉少奇之間如何看待和定位對方，雖 不無受到雙方直接互動經驗的影響，但最主要還是基於彼此與毛 澤東的關係親疏和變化。從1940年代中期到1960年代前半葉，彭 真視劉少奇為毛澤東的政治副手和繼承人而多予敬重和配合；劉 少奇見彭真屢受毛澤東器重，也對之加以信任和重視。在1962年 經濟調整問題和1964年社會主義教育運動上，劉少奇與毛澤東出現政策意見分歧；相對之下，彭真卻與毛澤東看法相近。毛澤東 因社教問題怒叱劉少奇之後，彭真對後者不假辭色地指正；爾後 局勢急轉，彭真反而先遭毛澤東離棄，劉少奇也迅速投入批鬥彭 真。從「文革」中毛澤東處置劉少奇、彭真問題的差異，以及彭 真晚年相關的政治自白，也反映了彭、劉在「文革」前並非形影 不離，而是有所距離。本文對彭劉關係複雜面貌的重建和其驅動 主因的探究，連帶所及，也對早期中共高層政治以派系立論的描 述和解釋，提出有力的挑戰。

Conventional interpretations of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership, especially the factional-politics model adopted by many Western scholars, tends to portray Peng simply as a true subordinate of Liu who supported Liu without reservation. This study, based on careful examination of evidences, demonstrates that the conventional view of Peng-Liu relations was significantly different from historical truth. Peng and Liu met and worked together briefly for the first time in 1928. After Peng was released from jail in 1935, they developed a close working relationship. However, instead of cultivating a closer bilateral relationship, their main concern and top priority were to carefully maintain their individual relations with Mao Zedong, as they both respectfully considered Mao as CCP’s top leader. Moreover, Mao became the most crucial factor affecting Peng’s and Liu’s attitudes towards each other. From the mid-1940s to the mid-1960s, Peng showed great respect and support for Liu, based on the perception that Liu was Mao’s successor and most important assistant; Liu supported Peng because Peng had always been entrusted with crucial political posts. Some subtle changes took place after the Great Leap Forward; Mao and Liu had divergent views on the issues of economic adjustment in 1962 and on the Socialism Education Movement in 1964. In contrast to Liu, Peng shared similar views with Mao on these issues; he sided with Mao without hesitation, even launched criticism against Liu. However, Mao’s relationship with Peng deteriorated quickly after 1965; Peng was purged before the downfall of Liu. It is worth noting that although both Peng and Liu were victims of Mao’s Cultural Revolution, Mao treated the two political figures differently: while Liu was persecuted to death, Mao showed some mercy towards Peng and disapproved accusations of treason against him. This showed that to Mao, Peng was not simply deemed as Liu’s trusted follower. In sum, this paper argues that during the pre-Cultural Revolution period, Peng and Liu were not the inseparable political allies as the analysis of factionalism has asserted.

彭真、劉少奇、毛澤東、中共政治、中共黨史

Peng Zhen, Liu Shaoqi, Chinese Elite Politics, Chinese Communist